Giltner Dairy, LLC. V. Jerome County Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 36528 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
3-30-2010
Giltner Dairy, LLC. V. Jerome County Appellant's
Reply Brief Dckt. 36528
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Giltner Dairy, LLC. V. Jerome County Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 36528" (2010). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2518.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2518
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Jerome County Case No. CV-08-1269 
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JEROME COUNTY, a political subdivision of ) 
the State ofIdaho, ) 
Respondent. 
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INTERVENOR-RESPONDENT'S BRIEFS 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District 
of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Jerome 
Honorable John K. Butier, District Judge, Presiding 
Terrence R. White, ISB #1351 
Davis F. VanderVelde, ISB #7314 
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Michael J. Seib 
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233 West Main 
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Gary D. Slette 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 8, 2010, 93 Golf Ranch, LLC the Intervenor in this matter, filed its Intervenor-
Respondent's Brief Thereafter, on March 9, 2010 Jerome County, Respondent herein, submitted 
its Respondent's Brief This brief replies to both the Respondent's and Intervenor-Respondent' s 
briefs. 
II. ARGUMENTS IN REPLY 
A. Idaho Code § 31-1506 does authorize judicial review of quasi-judicial decisions of 
county boards of commissioners. 
Intervenor-Respondent 93 Golf Ranch argues that I.C. § 31-1506 was intended to review 
administrative decisions of a county board of commissioners only, and not quasi-judicial 
decisions. It is not entirely clear what Golf Ranch means in drawing a distinction between 
"administrative" decisions and "quasi-judicial" decisions; it is a basic principle of administrative 
law that one of the tasks of administrative agencies is to adjudicate those matters placed within 
their jurisdiction by their enabling statute. See, e.g., Afton Energy, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., III 
Idaho 925, 928, 729 P.2d 400 (1986). In some of their duties, county boards of commissioners 
act as administrative bodies authorized to determine contested cases and thus exercise certain 
quasi-judicial functions. IHC Hospital, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners, 108 Idaho 136, 697 
P.2d 1150 (1985). If Golf Ranch argues that I.e. § 31-1506 cannot be used to review decisions 
in which a county board of commissioners applies existing law to facts to resolve a dispute 
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placed before it, its argument contradicts both the plain language of the statute and the way § 31-
1506 and its predecessor statutes have been applied in the past. 
First, the plain language of I.C. § 31-1506 authorizes judicial review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act of "any act, order or proceeding of the board ... by any person 
aggrieved thereby." Nothing in the language of the statute limits its application to any particular 
set of a county board's acts, orders, or proceedings, and nothing excludes quasi-judicial acts, 
orders or proceedings from its application. 
Second, I.C. § 31-1506 or its predecessor statutes have been applied in cases stretching 
back over a century to authorize judicial review of county actions that can only be characterized 
as quasi-judicial. For exanlple, in Latah County v. Hasfurther, 12 Idaho 797, 88 P. 433 (1907), 
the court conducted judicial review under a predecessor statute of § 31-1506 of a county order to 
open a private road and award damages to the owner of the road. In Fox v. Boundary County 
Board of Commissioners, 114 Idaho 940, 763 P .2d 313 (Ct. App. 1988), the Court of Appeals 
held that judicial review was authorized for a county's determination that a tavern was eligible 
for a beer license under I.C. § 23-1015. And in Application of Bennion, 97 Idaho 764, 554 P.2d 
942 (1976), a case bearing some resemblance to the present case, judicial review was conducted 
under a predecessor statute of § 31-1506 of a county order approving a planned unit 
development. The argument of Golf Ranch that I.C. § 31-1506 has no application to quasi-
judicial decisions of county boards is without merit. 
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B. This Court's decision in Burns Holdings did not hold that no statute authorizes 
judicial review of a county board of commissioners' rezone decision. 
Intervenor-Respondent 93 Golf Ranch places great weight on a statement m Burns 
Holdings, LIC v. Madison County Board o{Commissioners, 147 Idaho 660, 214 P.3d 646 (2009) 
that "there is no specific grant of authority to review the Board's action with respect to the 
request for rezone, and we may not assume the role of the legislature and grant that authority to 
ourselves." Intervenor's Brief, p. 4. However, Burns Holdings did not hold that no statute in the 
Idaho Code authorizes judicial review of a county's rezone decision. It simply held that the 
judicial review provisions of the Local Land Use Plmming Act (LLUPA) on which Burns 
Holdings relied do not authorize judicial review of a rezone, because these provisions are limited 
to decisions on permits authorizing development. Burns Holdings, 147 Idaho at 663. The issue 
of whether statutory authority for judicial review existed pursuant to I.C. § 31-1506 was not 
raised, briefed or argued in Burns Holdings, and was not discussed in the Court's opinion. This 
Court does not review issues not presented in the statement of issues or argued by either party in 
their briefs. Rheadv. Hartford Ins. Co. a/the Midwest, 135 Idaho 446,452,19 P.3d 760 (2001). 
As the issue was not raised in the case, Burns Holdings could not have held that I.e. § 31-1506 
does not authorize judicial review of a county board's rezone decision. 
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C. Giltner did assert in its petition for judicial review that the rezone decision of 
Jerome County was illegal. 
Intervenor 93 Golf Ranch claims that Giltner has not asserted that the decision of Jerome 
County was "illegal or prejudicial to the public interest." Intervenor's Brief, p. 2. Golf Ranch 
quotes the statement in Fox v. Boundary County Board o/Commissioners, 114 Idaho 940, 943, 
763 P.2d 313, 316 (Ct. App. 1988) that § 31-1509 (the predecessor statute to § 31-1506) provides 
a county taxpayer with the right to appeal any act, order or proceeding of the board "when any 
such act, order or proceeding is illegal or prejudicial to the public interest." Under this standard, 
Golf Ranch argues, a petitioner must allege that a board action is either illegal or prejudicial to 
the public interest. 
Giltner did make such an assertion in its petition for judicial review. Giltner stated in its 
petition that "Respondent's actions are in excess of the statutory authority of the Jerome County 
Commissioners, were made upon unlawful procedure, and are arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse 
of discretion." R. at 4-9, 10-15. An allegation that the Board's actions were in excess of 
statutory authority and made upon unlawful procedure is clearly an assertion of the illegality of 
those actions. 
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D. Any disparity between review of county and city land use decisions tbat would result 
from the application of I.C. § 31-1506 to county land use decisions is a result of a 
positive legislative choice to subject the acts, orders and proceedings of county 
boards of commissioners to judicial review. 
Intervenor 93 Golf Ranch argues it would create an "untenable situation" if zoning 
decisions of counties could be reviewed and zoning decisions of cities could not be reviewed. 
Intervenor's Brief, p. 4. However, any inconsistency between the availability of judicial review 
for county zoning decisions and city zoning decisions would simply be a result of a legislative 
decision to enact a statute subjecting decisions of county boards of commissioners to judicial 
review. The legislature provided for judicial review of decisions on permits of both cities and 
counties in the LLUP A. It did not provide in the LLUP A for judicial review of rezone decisions 
of either counties or cities, but another statute snbjects county board decisions generally to 
jndicial review. Golf Ranch's objection that cities and counties would, therefore, be treated 
differently would apply equally to any other matter that could be brought before a county board 
or city council, as a decision would be reviewable under § 31-1506 if it issued from a county 
board, but in the absence of specific judicial review provisions unreviewable if it issued from a 
city council. 
It does not matter that the availability of review under § 31-1506 would create the 
asymmetric result that county board rezone decisions would be reviewable while city council 
rezone decisions would not be reviewable. The legislature chose to enact a statute allowing 
review of county board decisions generally while it has not enacted a similar statute allowing 
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review of city council decisions. Unless prohibition is found in the Idaho Constitution, the Idaho 
legislature has plenary authority to legislate on any subject. Flores v. State, 109 Idaho 182, 706 
P.2d 71 (1985). The Respondents have stated no reason why the legislature could not choose to 
subject the "acts, orders and proceedings" of a county board of commissioners to judicial review 
without providing for similar review of decisions of city councils. 
E. No provISIon of the LLUPA triggers the "otherwise provided by law" exception 
contained in I.e. § 31-1506. 
Respondent Jerome County places great emphasis on the number of provisions in the 
LLUP A containing language relating to judicial review. Jerome County essentially argues that 
the legislature "surgically inserted" judicial review language in LLUPA provisions governing 
those matters it wished to be subject to judicial review, and omitted judicial review language 
from those provisions it did not wish to be subject to judicial review. Respondent's'Briej, pp. 3-
5. If the legislature really intended to permit judicial review only of those matters governed by 
provisions that contain judicial review language, it could then be concluded that the legislature 
intended no judicial review of a grant or denial of a special use permit, governed by § 67-6512, 
because that section contains no "judicial verbiage." The legislature presumably would also 
have intended to prohibit judicial review of the grant or denial of subdivision permits under § 67-
6513, and planned unit development permits under § 67-6515, because neither of these sections 
specifically authorizes judicial review. The judicial review provision contained in I.e. § 67-
6521, which authorizes judicial review of all decisions relating to permits under the LLUPA, 
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would be rendered a nullity. In construing a statute, it should not be presumed that the 
legislature enacted meaningless provisions, and effect should be given to all provisions of the 
statute so that no part is rendered superfluous or insignificant. Brown v. Caldwell School District 
No. 132, 127 Idaho 112, 117,898 P.2d 43 (1995). The legislature must have intended that § 67-
6521 be applicable to all sections of the LLUP A relating to permits, whether or not those 
individual sections contain references to judicial review. 
Likewise, the legislature would not have enacted I.C. § 31-1506 if, as Jerome County 
suggests, it did not intend it to be applicable to matters where specific authorization of judicial 
review is absent. The legislature provided a process for judicial review of decisions relating to 
permits in the LLUP A, but did not provide a specific process for judicial review of rezone 
decisions. "[A] particular pertinent statute will prevail over a general pertinent statute, but only 
'to the extent of any necessary repugnancy between them', or 'in case of necessary conflict', or if 
the particular and the general statute 'are necessarily inconsistent. ", Christensen v. West, 92 
Idaho 87, 90-91, 437 P.2d 359 (1968) (emphasis in original). Regardless of how many judicial 
review provisions the LLUP A contains, it does not contain a single provision that prohibits 
judicial review of rezone decisions. If the legislature truly intended to prohibit any judicial 
review of a rezone, it could have included in the LLUP A a specific prohibition of judicial review 
of a rezone, but it did not. 
There is no reason why multiple "gateways" to judicial review under the Administrative 
Procedure Act cannot exist. Fox v. Boundary County Board of Comm 'rs, 114 Idaho 940, 942, 
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763 P,2d 313,316 (Ct. App, 1988), In Fox, the Court of Appeals held that a judicial review 
provision in I.e. § 23-1015 only provided judicial review for an applicant for a beer license, and 
not for any other affected person, However, it held that I.C, § 31-1509 did provide a right to 
judicial review for a county taxpayer aggrieved by the decision, Id. at 943, If the LLUPA does 
not create a right to judicial review of a rezone, § 31-1506 does create such a right for a party 
aggrieved by the rezone decision of a county board "unless otherwise provided by law." The 
LLUP A does not provide otherwise, 
F. Intervenor-Respondent 93 Golf Ranch is not entitled to attorney's fees on appeal. 
Intervenor-Respondent 93 Golf Ranch claims it should be awarded attorney's fees under 
I.AR, 11.2, That rule provides that attorney's fees may be awarded on appeal against a party 
whose appeal is not well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law and is interposed for an 
improper purpose such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay, As discussed above, contrary to 
Golf Ranch's assertions no decision of this Court has held that judicial review of a county rezone 
decision is not available under I.C, § 31-1506, Giltner has presented a novel issue on appeal of 
whether or not I.C, § 31-1506 authorizes judicial review of the rezone decision of a county board 
of commissioners, and, therefore, an award of attorney's fees is not appropriate. 
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m. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Giltner respectfully requests that the trial court's order 
dismissing its Petition for Judicial Review be reversed, and that costs and fees be denied to 
Respondents. 
DATED this ::3Dday of March, 2010. 
WHITE PETERSON 
z#-==----avis F. VanderVelde 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the 30th day of March, 2010, I caused to be 
served two (2) true and correct copies of the above and foregoing instrument by the method 
indicated below to the following: 
Board of Commissioners 
JEROME COUNTY CLERK 
300 N. Lincoln, Room 300 
Jerome, ID 83338 
Michael J. Seib 
JEROME COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
233 West Main Street 
Jerome, ID 83338 
Gary D. Slette 
ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC 
134 Third Avenue East 
P.O. Box 1906 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1906 
~ U.S. Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
----X'- U.S. Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
~ Facsimile: (208) 644-2639 
~ U.S. Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
~ Facsimile: (208) 933-0701 
:WHITE PETERSON ~~
jg/W:\Work\G\Gihller Dairy, LLC 21980.000 93 Golf Ranch\2nd Judicia! Review 200S\APPEAL CV08-1269\BRIEFS\Rcp!y Bdefdoc 
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